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Access Reviews Policy

Document control

FieldValue
OwnerRon Benisty — CTO & CSO (ron.b@iontwrks.com)
StatusApproved
Version1.0
ClassificationConfidential
Approved byRon Benisty — CTO & CSO
Approval date2026-05-26 (Tuesday)
Last reviewed2026-05-26
Review cycleAnnual — next review due May 2027
Parent policySecure SDLC (SSDLC)

Satisfies ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.5.18 (access rights — provisioning, review, removal) and SOC 2 Type II CC6.1–CC6.3 (logical-access provisioning, modification, removal). Closes the access-review portion of the SSDLC gap analysis (referenced under §4 of the SSDLC umbrella).


1. Purpose​

Confirm — on a documented cadence — that every identity with access to S.E.T's systems still needs it at the privilege level it has, and remove access promptly where it is no longer warranted.

2. Scope​

SystemIdentities reviewedReviewer
GitHub (org + repos)All collaborators (S.E.T team + third-party dev firm members), bot/service accounts, deploy keys, Personal Access Tokens, GitHub AppsCTO & CSO
AWS IAM (management, shared-services, set-nonprod, set-prod-eu, future set-prod-il)IAM users, IAM roles, OIDC trust relationships, access keys, MFA statusCTO & CSO
WorkOSAdmin users + each customer Organization's ownerCTO & CSO
Logz.ioAccount members, alert channels, API keysCTO & CSO
CloudflareOrg members, API tokensCTO & CSO
Sub-processors with admin consolesOne named owner per processorCTO & CSO

3. Cadence​

FrequencyActivitySource / cross-reference
MonthlyGitHub audit-log review — review the rolling 30-day audit log for unusual access patternsSupply Chain §3
QuarterlyFull collaborator / identity reconciliation per system — for every identity, confirm: (a) still employed / contracted, (b) still needs access, (c) at the right privilege levelThis policy
QuarterlyIAM Access Analyzer review — investigate every flagged overly-permissive policyEnvironments §IAM
AnnuallyRight-to-audit exercise against the third-party dev firm — confirm their developer roster matches our GitHub collaborator listSupply Chain §3 + Audit Testing Scope §3

4. Off-boarding SLA​

  • Departing S.E.T-team member: all access revoked within 24 hours of departure decision — GitHub, AWS IAM, WorkOS, Logz.io, Cloudflare, hardware tokens collected, sub-processor admin consoles.
  • Departing contractor developer: dev firm notifies within the agreed contract window; S.E.T removes GitHub access within 24–48 hours (Supply Chain §3 contract clauses).
  • Compromised credential: revoked immediately as part of Incident Response.

5. Privilege model​

  • Least privilege at all times — every identity holds the minimum role required.
  • Separation of duties preserved per the Separation of Duties Policy.
  • No long-lived AWS access keys where avoidable — prefer assume-role with MFA and temporary credentials (Environments §IAM).
  • MFA mandatory on every identity that supports it (GitHub, AWS IAM, WorkOS).
  • Service accounts / bots are documented — purpose, owner, secret rotation cadence.

6. Evidence​

Each cycle produces:

  • A signed review record (the reviewer's checklist).
  • A diff of identities added / removed / modified vs. the previous cycle.
  • A short note for any identity intentionally kept at elevated privilege.

Retained ≥ 12 months per the Evidence Collection & Retention Policy. SOC 2 Type II will sample these records.

7. Document change history​

VersionDateAuthorDescription of changeApproved by
1.02026-05-26Ron Benisty (CTO & CSO)Initial version — establishes the access-review cadence and scope.Ron Benisty (CTO & CSO)