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Authentication & Identity

  • Provider: WorkOS (with AuthKit for hosted login UI)
  • Default region: EU (Ireland) — Israel-EU adequacy decision covers cross-border transfers for the majority of Israeli customers under Amendment 13
  • Protocols: OIDC, SAML 2.0, SCIM 2.0
  • Enterprise IdP Federation: Customers can bring their own IdP (Okta, Azure AD, Google Workspace, JumpCloud, Cisco Duo, Israeli local IdPs) via WorkOS SSO Connections
  • Local Users: WorkOS-hosted username/password (Argon2id) for users without an external IdP
  • WorkOS Organizations: Map 1:1 to S.E.T tenants — each WorkOS Organization corresponds to one Postgres schema (tenant_<id>); each org owns its own IdP connections, member set, MFA policy
  • SCIM provisioning: User lifecycle (create / update / deactivate) synced from each enterprise customer's IdP automatically
  • MFA: Enforced via WorkOS policies (configurable per organization — TOTP, WebAuthn, push)
  • Per-tenant branding: AuthKit hosted login displays each customer's logo and domain claim
  • Token Strategy: JWT-based (access + refresh tokens), validated server-side via WorkOS JWKS
  • Session lifetime — the three numbers, and they are compliance figures, not performance settings (Ron, 2026-10-07; set in WorkOS Dashboard → Applications → the application → Sessions):
    SettingValueWhy this number
    Access token duration5 minutesThis is the revocation bound while WorkOS is unreachable. Our guard verifies the access token locally, with no network call, so nothing done at WorkOS — a role change, a deactivation, a revoked session — takes effect until the current token expires. Raising it would buy outage tolerance and lengthen the worst-case removal window; 5 minutes keeps the compliance side short, on the reasoning that a WorkOS outage lasting longer than that already prevents new sign-ins.
    Inactivity timeout8 hoursAn unattended session must not live for the full maximum. 8 hours is one working day, so it ends a forgotten session overnight without signing out anyone who is actually working.
    Maximum session length1 dayThe hard ceiling regardless of activity — everyone re-authenticates daily.
    In normal operation the application bounds this far tighter than the token: the API forces a
    refresh once a verified token is older than 60 seconds, so a role change or a deactivation takes
    effect within a minute for every cause and every origin (our UI, the WorkOS Dashboard, SCIM, a
    revoked session). Ron accepted 60 seconds "for now", and it is deliberately not called
    immediate: access-reviews.md §4's 24-hour off-boarding clauses are met with roughly 1440x margin,
    but its "revoked immediately" wording is not met literally by any available route. Getting closer
    requires the revocation lever itself, which is P1.6's scope.
    Changing any of these three is a security change, not configuration: each one moves a number this
    table commits to. Evidence and the rejected alternatives: set-app
    .set/problems/PB-015-PB-017-design.md.
  • Audit: All auth events streamed to S.E.T's audit log + retained in WorkOS for compliance evidence
  • Phase 2 — Keycloak parallel for Nimbus-aligned customers: when the first Israeli-government / defense / regulated-healthcare / banking customer requires Israeli data residency and Israeli operational control (Amendment 13 + Nimbus Tender), a self-hosted Keycloak instance will be added in AWS Israel (Tel Aviv) alongside WorkOS. Per-tenant routing in NestJS auth middleware will determine which provider handles each login based on the customer's compliance profile.
  • Sub-processor disclosure: WorkOS appears in every customer DPA; SCCs added where EU adequacy alone is insufficient.