Environments
Two-tier model — nonprod + prod — on AWS using an AWS Organizations multi-account structure. Referenced by the Architecture and Supply Chain & CI/CD Security sections.
Account structure
The organisation is not empty, and never was. AWS Organization
o-fd790n26v6(management account517798688500) already holds five active accounts, verified 2026-09-28. Two of them are the scanners product, live in production and documented in the next subsection. Two of them are S.E.T's own, already created and currently empty. An earlier draft of this page planned five fresh accounts as though we were starting from nothing; that was wrong, and any plan built on it would collide with what exists.
| Account | Id | Status |
|---|---|---|
management (IONTWRKS) | 517798688500 | Exists. Holds org-wide CloudTrail; no workloads. |
set-shared-services | 727843826472 | Created, empty. No state store, registry, OIDC trust, keys or compute yet — only the default VPC. |
set-nonprod | 661255175401 | Created, empty. Same. |
set-prod-eu | — | Not created. |
set-prod-il | — | Not created. Phase 2. |
scanners-prod | 429134227608 | Live — the scanners product. Not S.E.T. |
scanners-cloud-access | 399827112847 | Live — scanners CSPM hop. Not S.E.T. |
Guardrails today: only two Service Control Policies exist, and both are scoped to a single account each — scanners-prod-region-lock on scanners-prod, and account-b-cloud-access-lockdown on scanners-cloud-access. Neither applies to S.E.T's accounts, which currently carry FullAWSAccess and no restriction of any kind. Region-locking and root-action denial for the S.E.T accounts are still to be built.
Planned roles for the S.E.T accounts
| Account | Role | When |
|---|---|---|
| management | Org root: consolidated billing, org-wide CloudTrail, IAM (users, groups, policies), Service Control Policies (SCPs). No workloads. | Day 1 |
| shared-services | ECR (container registry), Route 53 (DNS), Terraform state (S3 with native locking), audit-log archive, GitHub OIDC trust, cross-account deploy roles | Day 1 |
| set-nonprod | The nonprod environment (dev + QA + demo) | Day 1 |
| set-prod-eu | Production — Stockholm (eu-north-1) | Before launch |
| set-prod-il | Production — Israel (Tel Aviv, il-central-1), for Nimbus-aligned customers | Phase 2 |
AWS best practice: the management account holds only governance, never workloads — ECR and shared infra live in shared-services.
The two scanners accounts (live, not S.E.T — do not plan over them)
scanners is a separate product. It is already in production, in the same AWS organisation, in the same region S.E.T is moving to. S.E.T does not own it, must not reconfigure it, and currently has no connection to it at all — the only path from a scan into S.E.T today is a human uploading a report that S.E.T parses. All facts below verified read-only on 2026-09-28.
scanners-prod — account 429134227608, eu-north-1
The entire live scanners product: its API, its worker fleets, its database and its credential broker.
- Runs: one ECS cluster (
scanners) with eight Fargate services —api,easm-worker,dast-worker,cloud-worker,azure-worker,gcp-worker,cloudflared,openclaw-ops; RDS PostgreSQL 16.13 (db.t4g.small, single-AZ, private); six SQS queues (scanners-easm|dast|aws|azure|gcp|dlq); four ECR repositories; ascanners-cred-brokerLambda; VPC10.0.0.0/16; egress through a single NAT elastic IP; container logs shipped to S3 via FireLens. - There is no load balancer. The Cloudflare tunnel (
cloudflared) is the only ingress. Anything that needs to reach this API privately from S.E.T has to be built — it does not exist today. That account has interface endpoints for its own use (ECR, Secrets Manager, KMS, and an S3 gateway endpoint), but publishes no endpoint service for the scanners API, and there is no VPC peering or Transit Gateway. - Region-locked by SCP
scanners-prod-region-lock, which also denies enabling or disabling regions. - S.E.T already depends on this account, indirectly: S.E.T's CI evidence archive is the Object-Lock S3 bucket
iontwrks-ci-evidencehere (see Evidence & Retention §8). - Documentation:
scannersrepo —docs/DEPLOYMENT_AWS.md(its as-built section is authoritative), plusdocs/ARCHITECTURE.md,docs/CLOUD_MODULE.md,docs/CLOUD_CREDENTIAL_SECURITY.md. Product spec:products/scanners/. - Code:
scannersrepo —src/app/{api,engine,scanners,finalize,tasks}andinfra/.
scanners-cloud-access — account 399827112847
Not an environment. It is a deliberately near-empty assume-only hop: the single identity that reaches into a customer's own AWS account to perform read-only cloud posture scanning. Keeping it separate means the blast radius of customer-facing credentials is one account that holds nothing.
- Contains no workload — no Lambda, no database, no storage, no log groups. Two IAM roles from two CloudFormation stacks:
BinaryNetworksScannerAssumer, whose own description reads "Assume-only role; its sole power is to assume customer read-only CSPM roles", andJarvisReadOnly. - Exactly one principal may assume it —
arn:aws:iam::429134227608:role/scanners-cloud-worker-task, the cloud worker inscanners-prod. - This hop is for AWS only. External attack-surface and dynamic application scanning need no customer account at all (they reach the customer from the internet), and Azure/GCP use stored credentials in Secrets Manager under a dedicated customer-managed key that only the broker Lambda can decrypt.
- Locked down by SCP
account-b-cloud-access-lockdown. - Documentation:
scannersrepo —docs/CLOUD_CREDENTIAL_SECURITY.mdanddocs/CLOUD_MODULE.md. Product spec:products/scanners/modules/cloud/.
What this means for S.E.T's own build
- Do not reuse
10.0.0.0/16. The scanners VPC occupies it, with subnets at10.0.0.0/24,10.0.1.0/24,10.0.10.0/24and10.0.11.0/24. Overlapping ranges cannot be routed between, so S.E.T must pick a non-overlapping range now even though nothing is peered yet. - The private path to the scanners API is unbuilt work, not a configuration step, because that API has no load balancer and no private endpoint. It needs its own item.
- S.E.T's accounts have no guardrails yet (see above), while both scanners accounts do. That asymmetry is a finding, not a design.
- Naming: the scanners product uses a plural
scanners-prefix with a singular-workersuffix (scanners-cloud-worker,scanners-easm-worker). S.E.T's own components must not adopt names that read as though they belong to it.
Human access: IAM (not SSO)
S.E.T uses plain IAM for human team access — not IAM Identity Center / SSO.
- IAM users for team members, organized into role-based groups
- MFA mandatory on every IAM user — no console access without it
- Least-privilege IAM policies per group; quarterly access review
- Avoid long-lived access keys — prefer
assume-role+ temporary credentials with MFA for CLI/programmatic access; rotate any keys that must exist - Root account locked down: hardware MFA, break-glass only, never daily ops
- IAM Access Analyzer enabled to flag overly-permissive policies
Note: AWS recommends IAM Identity Center (SSO) for human access, and auditors generally prefer it (central identity, temporary credentials, cleaner offboarding). IAM-only is an accepted alternative for a small team, hardened here with mandatory MFA, least privilege, minimal long-lived keys, and quarterly reviews. Revisit SSO if the team grows or an auditor requires it.
What differs between nonprod and prod
| nonprod | production | |
|---|---|---|
| AWS account | set-nonprod | set-prod-eu (+ set-prod-il Phase 2) |
| URL | app-staging.binarynetworks.ai / api-staging.binarynetworks.ai | app.binarynetworks.ai / api.binarynetworks.ai |
| Region | eu-north-1 (Stockholm) | eu-north-1; il-central-1 Phase 2 |
| Availability | Single-AZ | Multi-AZ (3 AZs) |
| Fargate (api) | 0.5 vCPU / 1 GB, 1–2 tasks | 1 vCPU / 2 GB, auto-scale 2–10 |
| Fargate (workers) | 0.5 vCPU / 1 GB, 1 task | auto-scale per queue depth |
| RDS Postgres | db.t4g.small, single-AZ | db.m6g.large to start, scale class up as load grows, Multi-AZ + 1 read replica |
| Redis | cache.t4g.micro, single node | cache.r7g.large, Multi-AZ |
| Data | synthetic / sanitized — no real customer data, ever | real customer data |
| KMS keys | per-environment (never cross account) | per-environment CMKs |
| Backup retention | 3 days PITR | 35 days PITR + cross-region encrypted backups |
| WorkOS env | "Staging" | "Production" |
| Logz.io project | set-nonprod (Slack alerts only) | set-prod (full retention; PagerDuty + on-call SMS) |
| Deploy trigger | auto on merge to develop | merge to main + required-reviewer approval gate |
Why both names are flat (Ron, 2026-09-28). Every hostname sits one level under
binarynetworks.ai, so a single*.binarynetworks.aicertificate covers all four. A nested form such asapp.staging.binarynetworks.aiwould sit two levels down, which a one-level wildcard does not cover, and would need a second certificate.This is load-bearing for sign-in, not cosmetic. The browser app and the API are different origins but must remain the same site — the same registrable domain — because the session cookie is
SameSite-restricted, so on any other registrable domain the browser would not send it and login would break outright. Moving the API to any other registrable domain is an auth redesign (it would needSameSite=Noneplus real CSRF tokens), not a hosting change.
Production database scaling path
Start small, grow with load — all supported by RDS with minimal disruption:
- Start at db.m6g.large (2 vCPU / 8 GB, Multi-AZ)
- Scale instance class up (→ db.r6g.large → db.r6g.xlarge → …) via an RDS modify operation: applies to the standby first, then a brief (~60s) Multi-AZ failover, then the old primary — near-zero downtime
- Storage grows automatically via RDS storage autoscaling — no manual disk resizing
- Read replicas offload analytics/dashboard queries; add more as read load grows
- Net: medium now, bigger later, without re-architecture
Deploy flow
Full pipeline in the Supply Chain & CI/CD Security section. Summary:
feature/* → PR (validation job, no creds) → S.E.T-team review → merge develop
→ auto-deploy nonprod → QA / demo → PR develop→main
→ required-reviewer approval → deploy prod (rolling + circuit breaker + auto-rollback)
Implementation order
- management + shared-services — foundation (IAM, OIDC trust, ECR, Terraform state)
- set-nonprod — where development + testing happen first
- set-prod-eu — stood up as launch approaches, after validation in nonprod
- set-prod-il — Phase 2, when the first Nimbus customer signs
Cost estimate (early stage, before production load)
| Account | Monthly |
|---|---|
| management | ~$10 |
| shared-services | ~$30–60 |
| set-nonprod (single-AZ) | ~$120–200 |
| set-prod-eu (db.m6g.large, pre-load) | ~$700–1,300 |
| Total before production traffic | ~$900–1,600/month |
Production scales with customer load (+$1,000–3,000 at hundreds of tenants).
Current implementation
For the Binary Networks platform implementation and verified staging status, see App development and staging. S.E.T is a module inside Binary Networks. This specification remains unchanged.